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PREFACE 
This is the first of two papers dealing with mathematical methods 
that can be used to analyze hierarchical systems. 
In this paper, the authors look a t  the situation that  arises when cer- 
tain decision-making powers are delegated to various elements within a 
hierarchical structure. I t  is found that  these elements inevitably begin 
to operate in accordance with their own interests, which are not neces- 
sarily those of the system as a whole. Thus we have the problem of how 
to distribute the decision-making functions between the central body 
and the other parts of the system in such a way that the efficiency of the 
control system is maximized with respect to the global criterion. 
The authors take a game-theoretical approach to this problem. look- 
ing first at two-level hierarchical systems and using Germeyer's games 
as a model. They derive a number of methods for solving the problem 
thus formulated. and give some numerical results obtained using two of 
the resulting algorithms. 
ANDRZEJ WIERZBICKI 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences 
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1. INTRODUCTZON 
Hierarchical control systems form one of the most interesting classes of 
large systems with regard to theoretical and practical applications. Hierarchi- 
cal control problems were first formulated in connection with the need to  dis- 
tribute the  right to process information and the responsibility lor making deci- 
sions among the  various elements of the control system. Problems arise due to 
the fact that,  when different elements of the system have these rights and 
responsibilities and can exercise them independently, these elements inevit- 
ably begin to operate according to their own interests. which generally differ 
from t h e  global objectives of the system. Thus i t  is necessary to distribute t h e  
decision-making Functions between the  central body and the separate parts of 
the system in such a way that the efficiency of the control system is maximized 
with respect to  the global criterion (we shall assume that this criterion coin- 
cides with tha t  of the central body). This problem may be divided into two parts 
[I-31: t he  problem of analysis, i.e.. the  choice of a reasonable control for a 
Axed hierarchical system, and the  problem of synthesis, i.e., the choice of t he  
best structure for t he  control system. 
Game theory seems to provide the best approach to such problems. How- 
ever, traditional game theory does not consider a number of questions which 
arise in this particular case, e.g., how to deal with problems caused by t h e  shar- 
ing of information between different elements in the hierarchy, priorities in 
decision making, and lack of knowledge of the objective.function by some ele- 
ments. We shall therefore begin by introducing a class of games in which 
moves are taken in a Axed order and the process of information transfer is 
quite similar to  tha t  found in some hierarchical systems. 
Hierarchical two-person games describe the simplest two-level hierarchical 
system. This is the most thoroughly investigated hierarchical s t ructure,  and is 
of considerable importance. Let the objective of player 1 (representing the  
upper level of the hierarchy) be to increase the value of the criterion ~ ( 2 , ~ )  
using decision variable z EX, and the objective of player 2 be to increase the  
value of the criterion G(z ,y)  using decision variable y E Y. The principle 
behind the second player's move is to maximize his gain, given tha t  the out- 
come depends on his action only. 
I t  is assumed tha t  player 1 has the first move and knows the principle on 
which the second player will act, a s  well as being acquainted with F, G. X, Y. 
There are various formulations of the games now known as Germeyer's 
games [I] which depend on the information available to player 1 about the deci- 
sion of player 2. 
Game GI. Player 1 will not have any information on the choice made by player 
2: his strategy is to  choose a certain z1 E X and report i t  to player 2. 
Then the best guaranteed result  of player 1 is 
v = sup inf F(zl ,yl)  , 
x i @  y ieB1(z1 )  
where 
B'(z') = ly' E Y'( ~ ( z l , y ' )  = rnax ~ ( z ' , z ) j  , X' = X ,  Y' = Y 
z c r  
b e  G2. Player 1 will know the choice y2  E Y made by player 2: his strategy 
N 
is to  choose the mapping X2 = Is2: Y -, Xj. 
The best guaranteed result  of player 1 is 
inf ~ ( z " ~ , ~ ~ )  V z  = $lU& u+p(i.) 
b e  Gg. Player 2 formulates his action as a function y ( z ) ,  i.e.. he chooses a 
mapping g3 E = tq3: X' -, Yj. Player 1 has the first move and since he will 
know g3 he  reports to player 2 the mapping z3 which is an element of the se t  
529 = 153: P3 -, x'j. 
The best guaranteed result  of player 1 in such games is 
-3 -3 inf F(z  ,y ) 
= ;s:g!3 f 3 @ 3 ( 5 3 )  
In games G2 and G3 the sets of rnultivalued mappings ~ ~ ( 2 ~ )  and 83(g3) 
are defined (like gl(zl)) as the sets of possible answers of the second player, 
given that  the strategy of the first player is fixed. 
Increasing the number of iterations we can formulate games GZn, GZn+l, 
n 2 2 .  
The sets of players' strategies in game G2n are 
and the best guaranteed result of player 1 is 
-2n -2n 
v2n = 2z:$, inf ~ ( z  ,y ) . J " ~ 8 2 " ( 2 ~ )  
In game G2n+1 we have 
-*+I.  y&+i p + l  = 12 - . P - l j ,  p C 1 = j Y  -2n+l.  p n - 1  , j%?n-l] 
- inf -2n+l - h + l )  F'(. 9 Y 
"&+l - -a:?&+i pa+~E~~+~(;a+i)  2 
where 
&(gk)  = igk  E ?I ~ ( ? & , y " ~ )  = max G ( Z ~ , Z ) ]  .
ZEP 
The following relationships hold for n 1 2 [4]: 
Thus from the point of view of player 1 there is no point in having a stra- 
tegy more complicated than in games G I ,  G2, Gg. In other words, the &st three 
games can be regarded as basic and we shall confine ourselves to a considera- 
tion of these games only. 
Games GI,  G2, G3 have a natural economic interpretation in the  framework 
of the "Center-Producer" system [5]. 
1. The setting of prices z1 for the output y of the producer. The natural 
approach here is game GI, as in this case prices are chosen without any 
information about y . 
2. Decisions on fixed payments z2 (subsidies, premiums, assignments and so 
on). As accounts with the producer are settled on receiving the final pro- 
duct, he  may be informed beforehand of the chosen system of fixed pay- 
ment (i.e., how the amount paid depends on the results of his work). Here 
we have game G2 on the set of strategies p, 
3. Allocation of resources z3 (raw material, equipment, labor and so on). It is 
obvious that resources must be allocated before the production process 
begins, and formally the producer has the right to dictate his terms: 
g3 = y(z3). However, since the center has the first move he may report his 
strategy as the mapping z3: + X. This is a typical G3 formulation, 
although game G1 is also possible here. The guaranteed result of player 1 
in games GI, G2. Gg satisfies the relationship v < v g  C v2 ,  and thus the 
allocation of resources to the producer in a game G3 formulation is more 
profitable to the center than in GI. 
3. ANALYSIS OF TWO-LEYEL HIERARCHICAL SRXlWS 
Since Germeyer's games may be taken as models of two-level hierarchical 
systems, the analysis is reduced to the question of finding the solutions of the 
games formulated in Section 2. 
G a n e  GI. The problem of solving game G1 is reduced to that of solving a maxi- 
min problem with linked variables (see (2.1)). 
Assume that the criteria F and G are continuous on compact sets X,Y. 
Then the inner infimum in (2.1) can be replaced by a minimum. However, in 
the general case the function 
is discontinuous. Consider the simple example F = y - z2, 
G = ZIJ , X = Y = [-I. 11. Here f (z) has a discontinuity at point z = 0 and the 
first player has no optimal strategy. This means that &-optimal strategies z, 
should be found which satisfy the inequality f (z,) 2 v l  - e for given E > 0. With 
these assumptions f (z) is lower semicontinuous; in general i t  is multiex- 
tremal. 
In theory the problem ,may be solved using the penalty function method, 
which reduces it to an unconstrained optimization problem [1,6,7]. Consider 
the penalty function 
where d > 0. The reduction of problem (2.1) to a maximin problem with separ- 
able variables is based on the following theorem: 
Theorem 1 [6.7]. /f z, yields a solution of max min(F + cJ) at fized c , then f o r  
any sequence ck -, - the points zCk form an &-optimal sequence of strategies f o r  
the first player. 
A number of methods can be used to solve problems of the form 
rnax m i n { F ( ~ , ~ )  + cJ]. including stochastic programming methods [7.8] and 
non-smooth optimization methods [9-111. In addition to the 
nondifferentiability of the objective function there may be some difficulties 
connected with the multiple extrema of the problem, which make it necessary 
to develop appropriate optimization algorithms [12-141. 
The use of numerical methods to search for v l  and the E-optimal strategy 
of the first player is complicated by the fact that problem (2.1) is not neces- 
sarily stated correctly with respect to the functional, in that any small varia- 
tions in the second player's strategy G(z,y) (due to errors in computations, for 
example) can cause variations in the first player's guaranteed result. 
In the same way, for F = y , G = f (2) , X = Y = [0.1] the  optimal result of 
the first player in game G1 is zero. If the second player's criterion is 
G c =  G + ~(y-1). where e may take any small positive value, then the 
guaranteed result will be equal to 1, since 
for any z E X 
To obtain a numerically stable procedure for computing the best 
guaranteed results, it is necessary to regularize problem (2.1) using the 
method described in [15]. 
Came G2. We shall make use of the following values, sets and functions: 
L2 = max G(zP(y),y) = max min G(z ,y)  
Y EY y e Y  2 E X  
Here zP(y) is a penalizing strategy and za(y) is the absolutely optimal strategy 
of the first player. 
Theorem 2 [I]. Let v 2  = max(K2, Mz). men the strategy 
if y = y,. K2> M2 
i fy  E E ~ ,  Kz<Mz 
zP(y) otherwise 
is the &-optimal strategy of the first player in game G2. 
The case K2 > M, is particularly interesting: it corresponds to the situa- 
tion in which the objectives of both (the levels of the hierarchical sys- 
tem) are in some sense similar. 
The theorem formulated above shows that the problem of constructing the 
optimal strategy in game G2 is reduced to that of solving a nonlinear program- 
ming problem and a maximin problem with separable variables. 
h e  Gg. Let us define 
D3 = {(z,y)  I G(z,y) > L3 = min max G(z,y)l . 
t c X  ~ E Y  
K3 = sup ~ ( z , y )  S ~(z , ,y , )  + E .  B = {z E XI rnax G(z,y) = L2j 
( . , Y ) E D s  Y E Y  
B ( z )  = {y E YI G(z,y) = rnax G(z,z)j  
t € Y  
M3 = su min ~ ( z , y )  S min ~ ( z f ,  y )  + E 
~ E B Y E B ( ~ )  V E B ( Z J  
Theorem3 [1,4]. Let v 3  = max(K3,M3). men  the strategy 
is the &-optimal strategy of the first player in game G3. 
Here y", is the  strategy of the second player, which consists in choosing 
point y ,  E Y, and z: E B plays the role of a penalizing strategy. Thus the prob- 
lem of finding the optimal strategy in game G3 is reduced to that  of solving a 
mathematical programming problem and a maximin problem with linked vari- 
ables (value Mg and strategy z: E 8). 
4. A COhtBINF,D PENALTY AND Sl'OCHASLIC GRADIENT METHOD (CPSGM) 
In the previous sect-ion we showed that  a necessary step in the analysis of 
games '1,2,3 is the solution of the following minimax problem: Find 
z E XO and uo, where 
xo = lz E A I min F ( z , y )  = u0j 
YEY 
uo = max min ~ ( z ,  y  ) 
rEA Y E Y  
Let us consider certain stochastic algorithms for solving problem (4 .1) .  We 
may assume without loss of generality that  
and  also that  functions F ( z , y ) ,  q i ( z ) .  i = 1 ,  ..., m .  are continuous together with 
their derivatives with respect to  z on set  X ' x Y , X ' = O J X ) .  In addition, we 
assume that  Y is a compact set from E l ,  A # $, E~ > 0. 
I t  is clear that  
where j ~ , + ~ ( z )  = R - 11211. Now introduce 
where 
Here M represents the mathematical expectation, i is a random number 
whose values are taken from set 11 ...., m j with probabilities pl,  ...,p, ; y is a ran- 
dom number distributed on Y according to measure p in such a way that any 
non-empty intersection of y with any open set has positive measure. 
I t  is shown in [I] that  problem (4.1) can be reduced to a sequence of prob- 
lems in which it is required to maximize function (4.2) with cn = (cy , c z )  T m 
(this is the penalty function method). 
The stochastic gradient method [a] can be used to search for the max- 
imum of function Lq a t  fixed c .  If the algorithm allows for penalty parameters 
c , c 2  to increase. then we obtain the following iterative procedure: 
where 
vector z0 E X  and value E .  0 < E < E ~ ,  are both chosen arbitrarily; (yn.in) are 
the values of the random numbers (y , i )  during the  n - th  independent test; 
r1 = ( z l , u l )  is the initial approximation; and t % j ,  tb,j, { c n j  are control 
sequences. 
Theorem4 [16]. Let functions pi(z) , i = 1, ..., m+1 satisfy the condition 
where 
~ + l  ( z )  = ti I pi(z) ( 01 
f o ~  any point z E X, and the control sequences satisfy the following conditions 
T h e n  f o r  any initid a p p r o z i m a t i n n  (T l,z l) ,  s e q u e n c e s  jrn j , lzn 1 of  s o l u t i o n s  of  
a l g o r i t h m  (4.3) e x k t  s u c h  that, with p r o b a b i l i t y  o n e :  
( 1) A s u b s e q u e n c e  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  s e r i e s  of  n u m b e r s  {? 1 e x i s t s  s u c h  t h a t  
( 2 )  A f o l l o w s  f r o m  lim ,ch = 0 that t h e  l i m i t  p o i n t s  of  s e q u e n c e  Irns] 
s +- 
b e l o n g  t o  t h e  s e t  o f  s t a t i n n a r y p o i n t s  [ l o ]  of  p r o b l e m  (4.1). 
Remarks 
1. Condition (4.4) is satisfied if y ( z )  . i = 1, ... m, are concave and Slater's con- 
dition is satisfied. 
2. The following are  examples of sequences which satisfy conditions (4.5): 
3. The parameter ,cn is introduced into (4.3) to  follow the value of ah/ ar and 
to  provide a means of finding the  elements of the sequence trn'] which 
converges to t he  se t  of stationary points. (If F ,  pi are  concave with 
respect to z. then sequence trnj will converge to the set of solutions of 
problem (4.1) and there  is no need to follow parameter ,cn.) 
4. Theorems s imilar .  to  Theorem 4 but with different restrictions on 
sequences (4.5) and rather  more rigorous restrictions on functions F ,  pi 
have been proved in [?,I?, 181. 
5. A STOcHASl3C "ERRORS' METHOD FOR FINDING A MAXIMIN 
Let us consider problem (4 .1 ,  assuming that  functions 
F. p i ( z ) ,  i = 1, ..., rn, are  concave with respect to z on convex compact set 
X c Ek for any y E Y (where Y E El is a compact set)  and that both functions 
F, pi(z)  and their partial derivatives with respect to z are continuous on 
X x  Y , A  $ 4 .  
This problem can be reduced to t h e  following mathematical programming 
problem [I]: Find T = ( z  ,u) which solves 
max U 
2 ,u 
subject to 
m 
@ , ( r ) = - j l  m i n ( 0 .  ~ ( 2 . y )  - u ) l q p ( d y )  - C 1 min ( 0 .  p i ( z ) ) q > o  , Y  i = l  
where q r 1 , U is a line segment which includes 
[ rnin F ( z , y )  ; max F ( z , y ) ]  , 
(Z ,Y ) a x Y  ( z , u ) ~ X x Y  
and measure p  satisfies the conditions given on p. 8 in Section 4. 
Problem (5.1) is equivalent to the following problem: From the points 
r = (2.u) for which 
max tPq(r) = 0 , 
2 EX 
find the point with the largest value of u .  
Function Gq(r) can be treated as an "error" which characterizes the dis- 
tance of the point r from the feasible set of problem (5.1). This approach to 
solving problem (4.1) was suggested for the first time in [19] .  
Note that, as in (4.2),  we have Gq(r) = M p q ( r , y . i ) ,  where 
( p p ( r . y , i )  = - 1  min (0, F ( z . y )  -u)lq - ( l / p i ) I  min (0. p i ( z ) ) l q  , 
and random numbers y, i are as defined in Section 4.  
We can now formulate the following iterative algorithm: 
Tn+l = + %tn)  
on'' = ln [p" + bn ( p q ( r n  , yn , in)  - p n ) ]  
where n~ is the projection operator on R = X x V and vector tn is deflned by 
the formula 
Here 
I:(rn , y n  , in) is a conditional &,-subgradient of function (p, (-. y n  , in)  at  point 
rn  from set R ,  8, > 0 ; y n ,  in are the values of random numbers y and i dur- 
ing the n-th independent test; and ( T ' , ~ ' )  is the initial approximation. 
Parameter (pn in algorithm (5.3) follows the value of the error 
@ , ( T ~ )  , lim ( (pn - pq(rn) I = 0 P-a.s. At the n-th step, if the value of the error 
n +- 
is near zero ((pn 2 +) the value of u increases in accordance with (5.3), but if 
pn < -d, then the value of u changes in accordance with the stochastic quasi- 
gradient of the error Function. 
Theorem 5 [20]. Assume tha t  a cons tan t  k > 0 e z i s t s  s u c h  that  11 ( 11  < k , n = 1,  ... 
for a n y  y ~ ! ? = f ( ~ l , i ' ,  ..., y n , i  " . . . ) j ,  that s equences  j g , ] , l b n j  and 
t 4 , j ,  t L n j ,  ren{ e h t  m c h  tha t  
and t ha t  one of the fol lowing condi t ions  is sat isf ied:  
%n f o r  a n y  initid approz ima t ion  (rl,  pl), the sequence  rn defined b y  
a lgor i thm (5.3) converges  t o  the  s e t  of solut ions of p ~ o b l e m  (4.1) w i t h  probabil-  
ity one .  
Remark The following are examples of sequences which satisfy the conditions 
of the theorem: 
6. E-SUBGRADIENT DESCENT ALGOlUTHM MIR APPROXIMATION OF THE PARETO 
SET 
Consider the following parametric programming problem: Find 
z (a) E xO(a), where 
Xo(a) = tz E XI I ( z , a )  = max (z ' ,a)j  Z'EX (6.1) 
for all a E A .  
Function ~ ( z , a )  is assumed to be continuous on convex compact set  
X E El, for any a E A,  where A E E' is a bounded set. We say that point z* is a 
solution of problem (6.1) at  a = a+ with accuracy (&A) if p2(z*. ~ ~ ( a * ) )  < A, 
where p is a metric and 
Assume that values do , A. , a. > 0 are given. Let us construct an algorithm 
for finding (do. Ao). the approximate solutions of problem (6.1) at all d-nets 
Ad = f d  l , . . . .dNj  on A such that d S d o  and 
Here IIrzlI = m v  (4)  . a E ES. 
t 
We shall assume that I ( z , a )  is concave with respect to z on X for any 
a E A  , d i a m X s D a n d  
where L = const > 0. Let the solution of problem (6.1) be known with accuracy 
(bo,  A,) at values of parameter a = al from d-net A d .  
We shall determine the solution of problem (6.1) at the nodes of net Ad 
using the formula 
where nx is the projection operator on X; (F is the conditional e-subgradient of 
concave Function f ( -  , a n )  at point zn on set X ,  E > 0; and a is a step-size mul- 
tiplier. 
Theorem 6 [20]. Lf p a r a m e t e r s  a .  d ,  E of  a l g o r i i h m  (6.2)-(6.3) s a t i s f y  the  fol -  
l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :  
w h e r e  K is a c o n s t a n t ,  s o  that 11 (211 < K , n = 1 ..... N in (6.3), and 
2 1 p (I , Xs, (a1)) <- Ao. t h e n  all  s u b s e q u e n t  in . n = 2. ... . w i l l  s a t i s f y  c o n d i t i o n  
p2fzn 9 X6.(an )) < &. 
Thus. using algorithm (6.2)-(6.3) we can obtain the solution of problem 
(8.1) with precision ( d o ,  4) on d-net Ad, 0 < d 4 d o .  For any fixed 6 0 ,  A. i t  is 
always possible to find values of a , a and E which are sufficiently small that ine- 
qualities (6.4) are satisfied. 
We shall now show how algorithm (6.2)-(6.3) may be applied to vector 
optimization problems. 
Let vector criterion 
be defined and positive on X c Ek, and 
Let n(w)  be the set  of efficient vectors from W (Pareto-optimal vectors), where 
We shall use the following notation: 
where 
m 
P ( X )  = min \wi(z)  + 7 C wi(z) 
I s i s m  i =l 
It is shown in [21] tha t  for V e  > 0 37,d0, the  set  
where w(X) is an arbitrary point from w7(h) and krn is an arbitrary d-net on 
Am , 0 < d 5 do, is an &-net on II(w). Thus to And an &-net on II(w) it is 
sumcient to solve the  following parametric programming problem: Find 
for a l l X ~ q .  0 < d 5 do. 
If functions wi(z)  , i = 1, ..., m are concave and continuous on convex com- 
pact set X, then an approximate solution of problem (6.5) can be found.using 
algorithm (6.3). 
7. NUMERICAL, RESULTS 
The proposed algorithms were implemented and then tested on some sim- 
ple problems in order to  investigate their practical efficiency. 
7.1. CPSGM 
Algorithm (4.3) (with certain modifications) has been used to solve (4.1) 
with functions 
F l ( z ,y )  = cos (0.25(z1 + z2 + z3) + y l  - 0.5) + 
+ cos (0.25(z1 + 2z2 + z3) + y2  - 0.5) + cos (0.5(z1 + z2) + Y J  - 0.5) 
deflned on the product of unit  cubes. The following control sequences were 
used: [ ~ , , ] = T L - ~ ' ~ ,  f a n c n j = n - 1 1 / 2 0 , q  = I ,  E = O  for F1, and q = 2 ,  
- 71+'85 , b, = -0.72 
'=n - 
- ,0.2 
, Cn - for F2. 
- 15- 
The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The results obtained with the CPSGM algorithm. 
It can be observed that  a good approximation to solution z and the first 
approximation to u are obtained reasonably quickly. However, further 
refinement of the solution takes place very slowly. 
When the gradient of the efficiency function is computed using the  
difference scheme, the rate of convergence of the algorithm is the same as 
when the precise gradient is used. 
7.2. Errors Method 
The errors method (with parameters en = 0, a, = n4.', b,, = n-0.7g 
4 = 0.01n4.') was used to  find the maximin of functions 
Func- 
tion 
F, 
F2 
i +I 
~ ( z , Y )  = C cos (z, + yi - 0.5) ; i = 1.2 
) = I  
Initial 
approximation 
zO=(O.OOO, 
O.OOO,~.OO) 
uO= 1.OOO 
z0=(0.6,0.6, 
0.6.0.6) 
u0=2 
Number of 
iterations 
400 
800 
2400 
3200 
500 
1500 
9000 
17000 
defined on unit cubes. 
The results of the computations are presented in Table 2. 
Precise 
solution 
z *=(0.000, 
O.000,O.OOO) 
ue=2.634 
z *=(0.5000, 
0.5000, 
0.5000, 
O.$OOO) 
u =1 
Approximate solution 
With precise 
gradient 
z=(0.009,0.017, 
0 .009) ;~  =2.634 
z=(0.012,0.018, 
0.0 12);u =2.626 
z=(0.000,0.000, 
0.000);~ =2.6 19 
z=(0.000,0.000, 
0.000);~ =2:634 
With approx. 
gradient 
z=(0.000,0.000 
0 .018) ;~  =2.606 
z=(0.000.0.000, 
0.097);~ =1.549 
z=(0.000,0.000, 
0.016);~ =2.6 13 
z=(O.000.0.000, 
0.000);~ =2.624 
z =(0.4704.0.4668, 
u = 1.069 
z=(0.5118,0.4974,0.5014.0.5003); 
~ = 1 . 0 5 9  
z =(0.5005,0.4988,0.5006,0.4975); 
u=1.041 
z =(0.5002,0.50 12,0.4989,0.5030); 
u = 1.036 
- 16- 
Table 2. The results obtained using the errors method. 
Func- 
tion 
F 1 
F2 
No. of 
itera- 
ti ons 
200 
600 
5400 
10600 
200 
600 
42000 
84000 
Initial 
approx- 
imation 
zO=(O.OOO. 
0.000); 
uO=O.OOO 
zO=(O.OOO, 
0.000,1.000); 
u0 = 0.000 
Precise 
solution 
z *=(o.ooo. 
0.000); 
u *= 1.756 
z *=(o.ooo. 
0.000,0.000); 
u *=2.634 
Approximate 
solution 
z =(0.0277,0.0289); 
u = 1.809 
z =(0.000,0.0028); 
u = 1.900 
z =(0.0133,0.0089); 
u = 1.860 
z =(0.0037,0.0066); 
u=1.815 
z =(0.0458,0.0000,0.0133); 
u =2.721 
~=(0.0196,0.0066.0.0172); 
u =2.831 
z =(0.0046.0.0076,0.0119); 
u =2.791 
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